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FUENTES, Circuit Judge.  
 Ernesto Galarza is a U.S. citizen who was arrested for 
a drug offense, posted bail, and instead of being released, was 
held in custody by Lehigh County under an immigration 
detainer issued by federal immigration officials. Three days 
after Galarza posted bail, immigration officials learned that he 
was a U.S. citizen. The detainer was withdrawn and Galarza 
was released. Galarza then filed this § 1983 action against, in 
relevant part, Lehigh County, contending that Lehigh County 
detained Galarza without probable cause for more than 48 
hours, without notice of the basis of his detention or the 
ability to contest it. The District Court dismissed the 
complaint against Lehigh County on the basis that it could not 
be held responsible for Galarza’s detention because it was 
compelled to follow the immigration detainer. On appeal, 
Galarza argues that under a plain reading of the relevant 
federal regulation, immigration detainers are permissive and, 
to hold otherwise, would violate the anti-comandeering 
principles inherent in the Tenth Amendment. We agree with 
Galarza that immigration detainers do not and cannot compel 
a state or local law enforcement agency to detain suspected 
aliens subject to removal. Accordingly, we vacate and remand 
for further proceedings.  
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I.  BACKGROUND
1
 
 This case arises out of Ernesto Galarza’s detention by 
the Allentown Police Department and the Lehigh County 
Prison in November 2008. Galarza is a U.S. Citizen, born in 
Perth Amboy, New Jersey. He is a Hispanic man of Puerto 
Rican heritage. On November 20, 2008, Galarza was 
performing construction work on a house in Allentown, 
Pennsylvania. Sometime that day, the contractor on the 
construction site sold cocaine to an undercover Allentown 
Police detective, Christie Correa. Detective Correa arrested 
the contractor, along with Galarza and two other employees 
who were working at the site. All were charged with 
conspiracy to deliver cocaine in violation of Pennsylvania 
law. Two of the other workers arrested were citizens of the 
Dominican Republic, and the third was a citizen of Honduras. 
At the time of Galarza’s arrest, he had a wallet, which 
contained his Pennsylvania driver’s license, his Social 
Security Card, a debit card, and his health insurance card. 
After his arrest, Galarza was detained by the Allentown 
Police Department. The Criminal Complaint prepared by 
Correa at the time of Galarza’s arrest listed Galarza’s place of 
birth as Perth Amboy, N.J. and contained Galarza’s Social 
Security Number and date of birth. In accordance with 
                                              
1
 The District Court had federal question jurisdiction over this 
case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. This Court has appellate 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Because we are 
reviewing the appeal of a grant of a motion to dismiss under 
Rule 12(b)(6), our review is plenary. Great W. Mining & 
Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 163 (3d 
Cir. 2010). For the same reason, we state the facts in the 
amended complaint in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party below, Galarza. See Grammer v. John J. Kane 
Reg’l Ctrs.-Glen Hazel, 570 F.3d 520, 523 (3d Cir. 2009). 
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Allentown’s policy to contact Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (“ICE”)2 whenever persons arrested are 
suspected of being “aliens subject to deportation,” Correa 
called ICE and provided immigration officials with Galarza’s 
name, date and place of birth, ethnicity, and Social Security 
number. Galarza contends that, by making this call, Correa 
gave ICE reason to believe that she suspected Galarza had 
given false information about his identity.  
  
 That evening, Galarza was transported to Lehigh 
County Prison and his bail was set at $15,000. The following 
morning, Friday, November 21, Galarza went through the 
booking process, and during this process, he told prison 
officials that he was born in New Jersey. The officials took 
his wallet, containing his driver’s license, Social Security 
Card, debit card, and health insurance card.  
  
 At some point that day, ICE Agent Mark Szalczyk, 
acting on the information relayed by Correa, filed an 
immigration detainer with Lehigh County Prison. The 
detainer described Galarza as a suspected “alien” and citizen 
of the Dominican Republic. The detainer read:  
 
Investigation has been initiated to determine 
whether this person is subject to 
removal/deportation from the United States. . . .  
 
                                              
2
 ICE is the investigative arm of the Department of Homeland 
Security (“DHS”). DHS assumed the responsibilities of the 
former Immigration and Naturilization Service (“INS”) in 
2002. See Homeland Security Act of 2002, 6 U.S.C. § 101 et 
seq. 
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It is requested that you: Please accept this notice 
as a detainer. This is for notification purposes 
only. . . . Federal regulations (8 CFR 287.7) 
require that you detain the alien for a period not 
to exceed 48 hours (excluding Saturdays, 
Sundays and Federal holidays) to provide 
adequate time for ICE to assume custody of the 
alien. You may notify ICE by calling (610) 374-
0743 during business hours or 802 872-6020 
after hours in an emergency.   
 
App. at 105. The detainer was accompanied by neither a 
warrant, an affidavit of probable cause, nor a removal order. 
That same day, a surety company posted bail for Galarza, and 
a Lehigh County Prison official told Galarza that he would be 
released. Shortly thereafter, the same official informed 
Galarza that he would not be released because he was the 
subject of a detainer.  
 
 When Galarza protested that there should be no 
detainer preventing his release, the official told Galarza that 
he would have to wait through the weekend until Monday, 
November 24 to speak with a counselor. Galarza had not been 
interviewed by ICE or provided with a copy of the detainer. It 
was not until that Monday, three days after his arrest, that a 
Lehigh County Prison counselor told Galarza for the first time 
that the detainer holding him was an immigration detainer 
filed by ICE. Galarza immediately protested that he was a 
U.S. Citizen, and he urged the counselor to retrieve his wallet 
from the property room in order to look at Galarza’s driver’s 
license and Social Security Card, but the counselor refused. 
Shortly thereafter, Galarza met with two ICE officers, who 
questioned him extensively about his statement that he was 
born in New Jersey. Galarza gave the immigration officials 
his Social Security Number and date of birth. The officials 
left and returned to inform Galarza that the detainer was 
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being lifted. The detainer was in fact removed at 2:05 pm on 
Monday, November 24. Lehigh County did not release him 
until more than six hours later, at about 8:30 pm. Galarza was 
eventually acquitted by a jury of the charge stemming from 
his November 20, 2008 arrest.  
  
 Galarza filed two complaints: the first against Lehigh 
County, the City of Allentown, and various individual federal 
and municipal defendants for violations of his constitutional 
rights, and the second against the United States under the 
Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). 
These cases were consolidated. All defendants in the 
consolidated case, except the United States, moved to dismiss 
under Rule 12(b)(6). Galarza v Szalczyk, 2012 WL 1080020, 
at *1 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 30, 2012). The District Court held that 
the claims against ICE Agent Szalczyk and Allentown 
Detective Correa, for violations of the Fourth Amendment 
and the Equal Protection Clause, could go forward and that 
these officials were not entitled to qualified immunity. Id. at 
*2. The District Court dismissed a procedural due process 
claim against ICE Agent Szalczyk on qualified immunity 
grounds and dismissed all claims against another ICE official, 
the City of Allentown, and Lehigh County. Id.  
 
 In relevant part, the District Court determined that 
Galarza’s continued detention after he posted bail constituted 
a seizure within the Fourth Amendment and that the seizure 
was unsupported by probable cause. Id. at *9-14. Specifically, 
the District Court found that Galarza had stated a Fourth 
Amendment claim against Correa and Szalczyk because these 
officers lacked probable cause to issue an immigration 
detainer. The District Court reasoned: “[t]he fact that Mr. 
Galarza is Hispanic and was working at a construction site 
with three other Hispanic men—two of whom are citizens of 
foreign countries and another who claimed to have been born 
in Puerto Rico but is a citizen of the Dominican Republic—
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does not amount to probable cause to believe that Mr. Galarza 
is an alien not lawfully present in the United States.” Id. at 
*14. It also denied these officers’ motions to dismiss these 
claims on grounds of qualified immunity. Id. at *14-15.   
 
 However, the District Court dismissed the Fourth 
Amendment and procedural due process claims against 
Lehigh County on the ground that “neither of the policies 
identified in plaintiff’s Amended Complaint is 
unconstitutional [because] both are consistent with federal 
statutes and regulations.” Id. at *18. In doing so, the District 
Court relied on 8 C.F.R. § 287.7, concluding that detainers 
issued pursuant to this regulation impose mandatory 
obligations on state or local law enforcement agencies 
(“LEA”s), including municipalities, to follow such a detainer 
once it is received. Id. at *19. The District Court also 
dismissed Galarza’s procedural due process claim on the 
ground that Lehigh County complied with the federal 
regulation setting the time limits on detention because it did 
not hold Galarza for more than 48 hours, not including 
weekends. Id. The Court then dismissed the procedural due 
process claim against Szalczyk on grounds of the qualified 
immunity doctrine, noting that “even if the period of 
detention specified by the regulation were found to be 
unconstitutional, it would not be clear to every reasonable 
officer that the detention for a period expressly provided by 
federal regulation was unlawful.” Id. at *18.  
 
 Following the issuance of the District Court opinion, 
Galarza reached a settlement with the remaining individual 
defendants, the City of Allentown, and the United States, 
resulting in a final order dismissing the case as to all 
defendants. Galarza appeals only the dismissal of his 
complaint against Lehigh County. 
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II.  DISCUSSION 
 Galarza’s claims against Lehigh County arise under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983. To establish municipal liability under § 1983, 
Galarza must plead two elements: first, that he was deprived 
of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 
Constitution and laws, and, second that the deprivation of 
those rights was caused by an official government policy or 
custom. Mulholland v. Gov’t Cnty. of Berks, Pa., 706 F.3d 
227, 238 (3d Cir. 2013). Regarding his Fourth Amendment 
rights, Galarza contends that his detention resulted from 
Lehigh County’s stated policy and practice of enforcing all 
immigration detainers received from ICE, regardless of 
whether ICE had, or even claimed to have, probable cause to 
detain the suspected immigration violator. To support his 
claim, Galarza contends that: (1) when a Lehigh County 
Prison counselor first told Galarza that he had been held on an 
immigration detainer, the official refused to look into 
Galarza’s stated proof that he was a U.S. Citizen, instead 
waiting for ICE officers to arrive; (2) Lehigh County Prison 
honored the ICE detainer in this case on less than probable 
cause; and (3) ICE has a history of issuing and then 
cancelling improper ICE detainers lodged against inmates at 
the Lehigh County Prison. Regarding his procedural due 
process claim, Galarza contends that, under Lehigh County’s 
policies, he was held for three days without any notice of the 
basis for his detention or a meaningful opportunity to explain 
that he was a U.S. Citizen, despite his repeated requests to 
contest his detention.  
 
 At oral argument, counsel for Lehigh County conceded 
that the policies as alleged would be unconstitutional, and that 
Lehigh County’s sole basis for seeking dismissal of Galarza’s 
claims is the allegedly mandatory nature of ICE detainers. In 
this light, the only question on appeal is whether Galarza has 
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sufficiently pleaded facts to support his claims that Lehigh 
County’s unconstitutional policies or customs caused the 
deprivations of his Fourth Amendment and procedural due 
process rights.  
 
A. Interpretation of 8 C.F.R. § 287.73 
 
 The parties’ dispute centers on whether immigration 
detainers issued pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 287.7 impose 
mandatory obligations on state and local LEAs to detain 
suspected aliens subject to removal. The regulation at issues 
provides, in relevant part, as follows:  
 
                                              
3
It is true, as the dissent points out, that neither the U.S. 
Government or any of its agencies continues to be a party in 
this appeal. However, as the dissent also recognizes, the U.S. 
Government, as well as two of its agents, were parties to this 
case when the District Court articulated the principle that we 
review here. See Galarza v. Szalczyk, 10-cv-6815, Docs. 96 & 
99 (July 26, Aug. 22, 2012, E.D. Pa.) (orders dismissing the 
claims against ICE Agent Scalczyk and the U.S. 
Government); Galarza, 2012 WL 1080020 , at * 22 
(dismissing claims against ICE Agent Gregory Marino). In 
any event, as further explained supra, Part II.A., we doubt 
that the U.S. Government and its immigration agencies would 
disagree with our interpretation of the regulation. In fact, the 
Office of Immigration Litigation of the Department of Justice 
representing Janet Napolitano, then Secretary of the 
Department of Homeland Security, and other federal officials, 
admitted in a request for admission in a recent litigation that 
“ICE has no legal authority to require state o[r] local law 
enforcement to detain an individual during the 48-hour 
detention period.” Supp. App. at 8 (Apr. 5, 2013); see Jose 
Jimenez Moreno v. Janet Napolitano,11-cv-5452 (N.D. Ill., 
Nov. 8, 2011) (date of case filing). 
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(a) Detainers in general. Detainers are issued 
pursuant to sections 236 and 287 of the Act and 
this chapter 1. Any authorized immigration 
officer may at any time issue a Form I–247, 
Immigration Detainer–Notice of Action, to any 
other Federal, State, or local law enforcement 
agency. A detainer serves to advise another law 
enforcement agency that the Department seeks 
custody of an alien presently in the custody of 
that agency, for the purpose of arresting and 
removing the alien. The detainer is a request 
that such agency advise the Department, prior to 
release of the alien, in order for the Department 
to arrange to assume custody, in situations 
when gaining immediate physical custody is 
either impracticable or impossible. 
. . . 
 
(d) Temporary detention at Department request. 
Upon a determination by the Department to 
issue a detainer for an alien not otherwise 
detained by a criminal justice agency, such 
agency shall maintain custody of the alien for a 
period not to exceed 48 hours, excluding 
Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays in order to 
permit assumption of custody by the 
Department. 
 
8 C.F.R. § 287.7(a), (d) (emphasis added). Lehigh County 
argues that the phrase “shall maintain custody” contained in 
§ 287.7(d) means that detainers issued under § 287.7 are 
mandatory. Lehigh County acknowledges that § 287.7(d) is 
titled “Temporary detention at Department request” and that 
§ 287.7(a) provides that “[t]he detainer is a request.” 
However, Lehigh County maintains this language is 
overshadowed by the use of the word “shall” in § 287.7(d). 
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According to Lehigh County, the word “shall” means that the 
“request” is not really a request at all, but an order. Meaning, 
Lehigh County cannot be held responsible for Galarza’s 
three-day detention after he posted bail. Galarza argues that 
the word “shall” serves only to inform an agency that 
otherwise decides to comply with an ICE detainer that it 
should hold the person no longer than 48 hours.  
 
 We believe that Galarza’s interpretation is correct. The 
words “shall maintain custody,” in the context of the 
regulation as a whole, appear next to the use of the word 
“request” throughout the regulation. Given that the title of 
§ 287.7(d) is “Temporary detention at Department request” 
and that § 287.7(a) generally defines a detainer as a “request,” 
it is hard to read the use of the word “shall” in the timing 
section to change the nature of the entire regulation. Cf. 
Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 234 
(1998) (observing that a statute’s title and a section’s heading 
may be considered in resolving doubt about a provision’s 
meaning).   
 
 However, even if we credit that the use of the word 
“shall” raises some ambiguity as to whether detainers impose 
mandatory obligations, this ambiguity is clarified on 
numerous fronts. First, no U.S. Court of Appeals has ever 
described ICE detainers as anything but requests. Second, no 
provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 
U.S.C. § 1101 et seq., authorize federal officials to command 
local or state officials to detain suspected aliens subject to 
removal. Lastly, all federal agencies and departments having 
an interest in the matter have consistently described such 
detainers as requests. We will address each of these factors in 
turn.  
 
 First is the case law. All Courts of Appeals to have 
commented on the character of ICE detainers refer to them as 
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“requests” or as part of an “informal procedure.” See, e.g., 
Ortega v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 737 
F.3d 435, 438 (6th Cir. Dec. 10, 2013) (noting that federal 
immigration officials issue detainers to local LEAs “asking 
the institution to keep custody of the prisoner for the [federal 
immigration] agency or to let the agency know when the 
prisoner is about to be released”); Liranzo v. United States, 
690 F.3d 78, 82 (2d Cir. 2012) (noting that “ICE issued an 
immigration detainer to [jail] officials requesting that they 
release Liranzo only into ICE’s custody” so that he could be 
removed from the United States); United States v. Uribe-Rios, 
558 F.3d 347, 350 n.1 (4th Cir. 2009) (defining detainers as a 
“request that another law enforcement agency temporarily 
detain an alien” to permit immigration officials to assume 
custody (citing 8 C.F.R. § 287.7)); United States v. Female 
Juvenile, A.F.S., 377 F.3d 27, 35 (1st Cir. 2004) (noting that a 
“detainer . . . serves as a request that another law enforcement 
agency notify the INS before releasing an alien from 
detention” (citing 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(a))); Giddings v. 
Chandler, 979 F.2d 1104, 1105 n.3 (5th Cir. 1992) 
(describing the procedure under § 287.7 as “an informal [one] 
in which the INS informs prison officials that a person is 
subject to deportation and requests that officials give the INS 
notice of the person’s death, impending release, or transfer to 
another institution”).  
 
 Second, Congress’s only specific mention of detainers 
appears in INA § 287, 8 U.S.C. § 1357(d). The Act does not 
authorize federal officials to command state or local officials 
to detain suspected aliens subject to removal. Moreover, in 
reviewing this statute, the Supreme Court has noted that 
§ 1357(d) is a request for notice of a prisoner’s release, not a 
command (or even a request) to LEAs to detain suspects on 
behalf of the federal government. Arizona v. United States, 
132 S. Ct. 2492, 2507 (2012) (observing that “[s]tate officials 
can also assist the Federal Government by responding to 
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requests for information about when an alien will be released 
from their custody. See § 1357(d).”).  
 
 Contrary to Lehigh County’s assertion, ICE’s (and its 
precursor INS’s) policy statements also hold persuasive 
weight in this context. See Mercy Catholic Med. Ctr. v. 
Thompson, 380 F.3d 142, 155 (3d Cir. 2004). Since at least 
1994, and perhaps as early as 1988, ICE (and its precursor 
INS) have consistently construed detainers as requests rather 
than mandatory orders. In 1994, when responding to 
comments provided in the process of administrative “Notice 
and Comment” before a “Final Rule” change amending 8 
C.F.R. § 287.7, the INS wrote that, “A detainer is the 
mechanism by which the Service requests that the detaining 
agency notify the Service of the date, time, or place of release 
of an alien who has been arrested or convicted under federal, 
state, or local law.” 59 Fed. Reg. 42406, 42407 (Aug. 17, 
1994). Moreover, in a 2010 policy memo, ICE describes a 
detainer as a “request that the LEA maintain custody of an 
alien who would otherwise be released for a period not to 
exceed 48 hours.”4 This description is restated on ICE’s 
website under “Frequently Asked Questions” about ICE 
detainers in response to the specific question “What is an 
immigration detainer?”5 In response to a local official’s letter 
asking whether “localities are required to hold individuals 
                                              
4
 ICE, Interim Policy Number 10074.1: Detainers, ¶ 2.1 (Aug. 
2, 2010), available at 
http://cironline.org/sites/default/files/legacy/files/ICEdetainer
policy.PDF (last visited Dec. 13, 2013). 
5
 ICE, ICE Detainers: Frequently Asked Questions, 
http://www.ice.gov/news/library/factsheets/detainer-faqs.htm 
(last visited Dec. 23, 2013) (noting that an immigration 
detainer serves, in relevant part, as a “request that the LEA 
maintain custody of an alien who would otherwise be released 
for a period not to exceed 48 hours”). 
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pursuant to [ICE detainers],” a senior ICE official responded: 
“ICE views an immigration detainer as a request that a law 
enforcement agency maintain custody of an alien who may 
otherwise be released[.]”6 And in a 2010 briefing to the 
Congressional Hispanic Caucus, agency representatives told 
congressional staff that “local [law enforcement] are not 
mandated to honor a detainer, and in some jurisdictions they 
do not.”7 
 
 These policy statements are also consistent with ICE’s 
(and previously INS’s) litigation position that detainers are 
requests or notifications. For example, in 1998, the INS 
argued that a detainer it issued was “not a detainer but merely 
serve[d] to advise [a] correctional facility that the INS may 
find [an inmate] excludable and request[ed] that the 
institution inform the INS of Vargas’s expected release.” 
Vargas v. Swan, 854 F.2d 1028, 1030 (7th Cir. 1988). 
Furthermore, the immigration agency there noted “that the 
face of the detainer states that it is ‘for notification purposes 
only,’” and that it was “nothing more than ‘an internal 
administrative mechanism,’ . . . accompanied by neither a 
warrant of arrest nor by an order to show cause.” Id. 
                                              
6
 Letter from David Venturella, Secure Communities 
Assistant Director, ICE, to Miguel Márquez, Santa Clara 
County Counsel, ¶ 2(a) (Sept. 27, 2010) (emphasis added), 
available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/38550589/ICELetter-
Responding-to-SCC-Re-S-Comm-9-28-10 (last visited Dec. 
23, 2013). 
7
 ICE FOIA 2674.020612, Draft Memorandum to David 
Venturella, Secure Communities Assistant Director, ICE, 
“Secure Communities Briefing (Congressional Hispanic 
Caucus)” at 3 (Oct. 28, 2010), available at 
http://altopolimigra.com/wpcontent/uploads/2011/12/ICE-
FOIA-2674.020612.pdf (last visited Dec. 23, 2013). 
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 To rebut the evidence that detainers are not mandatory 
or commands to other LEAs, Lehigh County suggests that 
these statements are contradicted by the language of the 
detainer form that was issued in Galarza’s case. Lehigh 
County’s argument here is similar to the one it made 
regarding the regulation itself: Because the detainer issued to 
Lehigh County stated that “Federal regulations (8 CFR 287.7) 
require that you detain the alien for a period not to exceed 48 
hours (excluding Saturdays, Sundays and Federal holidays),” 
the detainer was mandatory. App. at 105. Again, Lehigh 
County overlooks the first part of the detainer filed with 
Lehigh County, which read at the time, “It is requested that 
you: Please accept this notice as a detainer. This is for 
notification purposes only.” Id. (emphasis added).  
 
 Lehigh County seeks to bolster its argument by 
highlighting the fact that the detainer forms were altered in 
2010 so that the word “require” does not appear anywhere on 
the current detainer form. The form now reads: “IT IS 
REQUESTED THAT YOU: Maintain custody of the subject 
for a period NOT TO EXCEED 48 HOURS.”8 We believe 
that, on its own, this alteration in the detainer form does not 
support Lehigh County’s conclusion that ICE’s position 
changed—the alteration is also consistent with the view that 
ICE was merely clarifying its detainer form to reflect its 
longstanding interpretation of the regulation. In short, the 
position of federal immigration agencies has remained 
constant: detainers are not mandatory.
9
 
                                              
8
 DHS, IMMIGRATION DETAINER-NOTICE OF 
ACTION, available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-
communities/pdf/immigration-detainer-form.pdf (last visited 
Dec. 23, 2013). 
9
 To further respond to Lehigh County’s argument that these 
policy statements and litigation positions should not be 
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 B. Constitutional Concerns 
  
 Even if there were any doubt about whether 
immigration detainers are requests and not mandatory orders 
to local law enforcement officials, settled constitutional law 
clearly establishes that they must be deemed requests. When 
confronted with two plausible interpretations of a statute, one 
which could require the Court to interpret the regulation as 
unconstitutional and one which poses no constitutional 
problem, we are obliged to adopt the latter interpretation, 
“unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of 
Congress.” Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast 
Bldg. & Const. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988).  
 
Under the Tenth Amendment, immigration officials 
may not order state and local officials to imprison suspected 
aliens subject to removal at the request of the federal 
government. Essentially, the federal government cannot 
command the government agencies of the states to imprison 
persons of interest to federal officials. 
                                                                                                     
relevant in our analysis, we note that the particular weight to 
give to ICE’s and INS’s policy statements depends on a 
number of factors. These include “the thoroughness evident in 
[their] consideration, the validity of [their] reasoning, [their] 
consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all 
those factors which give [them] power to persuade, if lacking 
power to control.” Mercy, 380 F.3d at 155 (internal quotation 
marks omitted). ICE’s and INS’s policy statements and 
litigation positions are probative here because they are 
internally consistent over a lengthy period of time and align 
with the most logical reading of the regulation, thus lending 
further support to our determination that ICE detainers are 
indeed permissive, not mandatory.  
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As we have previously recognized, “all powers not 
explicitly conferred to the federal government are reserved to 
the states, a maxim reflected in the text of the Tenth 
Amendment.” Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n (“NCAA”) v. 
Governor of N.J., 730 F.3d 208, 227 (3d Cir. 2013). It follows 
that “any law that commandeers the legislative processes [and 
agencies] of the States by directly compelling them to enact 
and enforce a federal regulatory program is beyond the 
inherent limitations on federal power within our dual system.” 
Id. (quoting Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation 
Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 283 (1981)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). In other words, a conclusion that a detainer issued 
by a federal agency is an order that state and local agencies 
are compelled to follow, is inconsistent with the anti-
commandeering principle of the Tenth Amendment. 
 
On two occasions the Supreme Court has struck down 
portions of federal laws that compelled states or local state 
agencies on anti-commandeering grounds. The first case was 
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), which 
concerned a federal law to regulate the disposal of radioactive 
wastes by the states. The most problematic aspect of this 
complex regulatory scheme was the requirement that a state 
“take title” to radioactive material, if that state could not 
arrange for disposal of the hazardous material within a 
specified date. Id. at 153-54. The Supreme Court struck down 
the “take title” provision based on the idea that “Congress 
may not simply ‘commandeer the legislative processes of the 
States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a 
federal regulatory program.’” Id. at 161 (quoting Hodel, 452 
U.S. at 288) (alterations omitted). As we stated in NCAA, the 
Court concluded that the “take title” provision did, in fact, 
“compel the states to either enact a regulatory program, or 
expend resources in taking title to the waste.” NCAA, 730 
F.3d at 229 (citing New York, 505 U.S. at 176). The Court 
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also observed that “the anti-commandeering principle was 
designed, in part, to stop Congress from blurring the line of 
accountability between federal and state officials and from 
skirting responsibility for its choices by foisting them on the 
states.” Id. (citing New York, 505 U.S. at 168). 
 
The Court next applied this anti-comandeering 
principle in Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997), to 
invalidate provisions of the Brady Handgun Violence 
Prevention Act that compelled local authorities of certain 
states to conduct background checks on persons applying to 
purchase guns. Printz is relevant in determining whether 
federal officials can order local and state LEAs to hold 
suspected aliens subject to removal in detention on behalf of 
the federal government. The Court noted that, “[t]he power of 
the Federal Government would be augmented immeasurably 
if it were able to impress into its service—and at no cost to 
itself—the police officers of the 50 States.” Id. at 922. The 
Court concluded that Congress “may neither issue directives 
requiring the States to address particular problems, nor 
command the States’ officers . . . to administer or enforce a 
federal regulatory program.” Id. at 935. The Court was clearly 
concerned that portions of the Brady Act required states to 
“absorb the financial burden of implementing a federal 
regulatory program” and “tak[e] the blame for its . . . 
defects.” Id. at 930. 
 
In light of these principles, it is clear to us that reading 
§ 287.7 to mean that a federal detainer filed with a state or 
local LEA is a command to detain an individual on behalf of 
the federal govenment, would violate the anti-commandeering 
doctrine of the Tenth Amendment. As in New York and 
Printz, immigration officials may not compel state and local 
agencies to expend funds and resources to effectuate a federal 
regulatory scheme. The District Court’s interpretation of 
§ 287.7 as compelling Lehigh County to detain prisoners for 
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the federal government is contrary to the Federal Constitution 
and Supreme Court precedents.  
 
 There is no meaningful distinction between the Brady 
Act provisions and the regulation at issue here which would, 
according to Lehigh County, require state and local 
governments to spend public funds in order to detain suspects 
on behalf of the federal government for the 48-hour period. In 
fact, the federal government has made clear that local LEAs 
have to foot the bill, providing that “[n]o detainer issued as a 
result of a determination made under this chapter . . . shall 
incur any fiscal obligation on the part of the Department.” 
8 C.F.R. § 287.7(e). Even though, as the Amici Curiae Law 
Professors explain, the issue of commandeering is not one of 
degree, “[s]uch direct federal control over state officials far 
exceeds the regulatory regime Printz invalidated.” Br. for 
Law Professors at 14.  
 
 Furthermore, the command to detain federal prisoners 
at state expense is exactly the type of command that has 
historically disrupted our system of federalism. As Galarza 
points out, the federal government has made requests to states 
to house federal prisoners since the Founding of the Republic, 
and such requests represent the quintessential type of 
cooperation sanctioned by the Framers. The Court in Printz 
relied on this history in developing the contours of the 
concept of commandeering that must have existed at the time 
of the Constitution’s Framing. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 909-10 
(discussing the practice of early Congress (1789-91) issuing 
recommendations to state legislatures to house federal 
prisoners and noting that when states failed to comply, 
Congress’s reaction was simply “to rent a temporary jail until 
provision for a permanent one could be made”).   
 
 Because of this potential constitutional problem, and 
because Congress has made no mention in the INA that it 
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intends for DHS to issue mandatory detainers, see supra Part 
II.A., we must read the regulation as authorizing only 
permissive requests that local LEAs keep suspected aliens 
subject to deportation in custody. In fact, in recognition of 
their right to refuse requests under § 287.7, a number of local 
governments, the District of Columbia, and now the state of 
California, have established official policies whereby they 
will only detain suspects pursuant to ICE detainers in 
situations where the suspect named in an immigration 
detainer has been convicted of or is charged with a serious 
crime.
10
 
                                              
10
 See, e.g., Santa Clara County, Cal., Board of Supervisors’ 
Policy Manual § 3.54, Civil Immigration Detainer Requests 
(resolution adopting § 3.54) (2010), available at 
http://bit.ly/YiQ8y6 (“No County department, agency, officer, 
or employee shall use any County funds, resources, or 
personnel to investigate, question, apprehend, or arrest an 
individual solely for an actual or suspected civil violation of 
federal immigration law.”); Cook County, Ill., Ordinance 
§ 46-37, available at http://bit.ly/15SWpFY (“WHEREAS, 8 
CFR § 287.7 expressly provides that ICE detainers are merely 
‘requests’ that local law enforcement advise DHS when the 
individual is due to be released, and that the agency continue 
holding the individual beyond the scheduled time of release 
for up to 48 hours, excluding weekends and federal holidays, 
in order for ICE to arrange to assume custody … (a) The 
Sheriff of Cook County shall decline ICE detainer requests 
unless there is a written agreement with the federal 
government by which all costs incurred by Cook County in 
complying with the ICE detainer shall be reimbursed.”); 
Chicago Municipal Code §§ 2-173-05, 2-173-042 (first 
adopted 2012), available at http://bit.ly/ZQxQFD (declining 
to honor detainers unless the subject of the investigation has 
an oustanding criminal warrant, has been convicted of a 
felony, has a felony charge pending, or has been identified as 
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 Thus, any remaining ambiguity must be resolved in 
favor of a constitutional reading of the regulation. In this 
case, that means we must read the regulation as authorizing 
only requests that state and local law enforcement agencies 
detain suspected aliens subject to removal.  
 
III. CONCLUSION 
  
 For these reasons, we conclude that 8 C.R.F. § 287.7 
does not compel state or local LEAs to detain suspected 
aliens subject to removal pending release to immigration 
officials. Section 287.7 merely authorizes the issuance of 
detainers as requests to local LEAs. Given this, Lehigh 
County was free to disregard the ICE detainer, and it 
therefore cannot use as a defense that its own policy did not 
cause the deprivation of Galarza’s constitutional rights. 
Accordingly, the District Court’s judgment dismissing 
Galarza’s complaint against Lehigh County is VACATED 
                                                                                                     
a known gang member); N.Y.C., N.Y., Administrative Code 
§ 9-131(first adopted 2012) (same, and adding a condition 
that a detainer could be honored for a terrorism suspect as 
well); City of Berkeley, California Council, Regular Meeting 
Annotated Agenda (Oct. 30, 2012), available at 
http://bit.ly/WOmMfO (similar to N.Y.C. and Chicago 
policies); D.C. Acts 19-442, Immigration Detainer 
Compliance Amendment Act of 2012, 59 D.C. Reg. 10153-55 
(same); Brent Begin, San Francisco County Jail Won’t Hold 
Inmates for ICE, SF EXAMINER (May 6, 2011) (describing 
policy adopted by San Francisco Sheriff Michael Hennessey 
to not honor detainers for those arrested for minor crimes). In 
fact, just recently, California adopted a statute limiting LEAs 
throughout the entire state from cooperating with ICE 
detainers. Cal Gov’t Code § 7282 et seq. (effective Jan. 1, 
2014).  
 
 24 
 
and the matter is REVERSED for proceedings consistent with 
this opinion.  
Galarza v. Lehigh County, No. 12-3991  
BARRY, Circuit Judge, dissenting 
 I am deeply concerned that the United States has not 
been heard on the seminal issue in this appeal, an issue that 
goes to the heart of the enforcement of our nation’s 
immigration laws.  And make no mistake about it.  The 
conclusion reached by my friends in the Majority that 
immigration detainers issued pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 287.7 do 
not impose any obligation on state and local law enforcement 
agencies to detain suspected aliens subject to removal, but are 
merely requests that they do so, has enormous implications 
and will have, I predict, enormous ramifications.   
 
 Maybe the Majority is right when it says that the 
language that the particular agency “shall maintain custody,” 
§ 287.7(d), is really only “a request,” § 287.7(a).  And maybe 
the Majority is wrong.  I’m simply not ready to make that 
call; indeed, I believe that it is a mistake to do so without the 
input of the United States, on whom the Opinion will impact 
most immediately and most profoundly.
 1
  And even aside 
from that impact will be the impact on state and local law 
enforcement agencies, not the least of which will be for them 
to figure out what hoops they will have to jump through to 
inform their decision as to whether or not to grant a particular 
“request.”  Will, for example, they have to determine if, in the 
first instance, ICE had probable cause to issue the detainer?  
Will the detainee have a right to be heard?  And, pray tell, 
how and when will they do all of that?  And that’s just for 
starters.   
                                                 
1
 ICE issued 273,982 immigration detainers from October 1, 
2011 to September 30, 2012 (Fiscal Year 2012).  In the first 
four months of Fiscal Year 2013, it issued 73,709 detainers, 
corresponding to an annualized figure of 221,124.  See 
Number of ICE Detainers Drops by 19 Percent.  
Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse at Syracuse 
Univ. (July 25, 2013), 
http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/325/.  These numbers, 
I recognize, cover all detainers issued by ICE, and not just 
those which direct a law enforcement agency to maintain 
custody over a suspected removable alien.    
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 This was, until now, a comparatively uncomplicated 
case brought by Mr. Galarza, who, as relevant here, was 
detained within the brief period of time set forth in § 287.7(d) 
after bail was posted on his criminal charges.  The United 
States was not a party in this § 1983 action,
2
 and the only 
defendants were Lehigh County, the City of Allentown and 
one of its detectives, and two ICE agents, named only in their 
individual capacities.  Parenthetically, although the ICE 
agents were represented by counsel from the Department of 
Justice, counsel made it abundantly clear to the District Court 
that she did not represent ICE and represented only her 
clients.  See, e.g., Tr. of Dec. 15, 2011 at 48-49.  The District 
Court well understood that fact.  Id.   
 
 The sole appellee in this case is Lehigh County, whose 
only involvement with reference to the central issue before us 
on appeal is that Galarza was briefly housed in one of its 
prisons, and that it, through its prison, complied with the 
immigration detainer once the detainer kicked in.  The 
County, not surprisingly, argued to the District Court why the 
“shall maintain custody” language was mandatory—it had, it 
said, no choice in the matter.  Galarza, also not surprisingly, 
argued that the language was not mandatory, and that the 
District Court’s erroneous conclusion to the contrary was the 
result of a “misunderstanding of immigration detainers” 
because of Lehigh County’s arguments, “not the federal 
government’s.”  Appellant’s Br. at 23, 29.  Indeed, Galarza 
concedes that the United States was not heard as to  § 287.7 
nor even as to its “own statements” that immigration detainers 
                                                 
2
 The United States was named as a defendant in a separate 
negligence action filed by Galarza under the Federal Tort 
Claims Act.  The central issue before us here was never 
squarely raised there, and neither the Majority nor Galarza 
suggests that it was or should have been.  Although the FTCA 
action was subsequently consolidated with this § 1983 action, 
presumably so that they could be before one judge, not two, it 
was separately treated and resolved.  Thus, it is only in the 
most technical sense that one can say, as the Majority says at 
note 3, that the “U.S. Government,” which it “doubt[s]” 
would disagree with its interpretation of § 287.7, was a 
“part[y] to this case” when the District Court articulated the 
principle before us on appeal.   
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are requests, not orders.  Id. at 29.  Of course, we don’t know 
what the “federal government” would have argued—it was 
not in the case.   
 
 And the record before the District Court on the central 
issue before us was barebones.  In this connection, it bears 
emphasis that that issue, i.e. whether or not detainers issued 
pursuant to § 287.7 impose a mandatory obligation to detain 
on state and local law enforcement agencies, was but one of 
numerous issues raised in the District Court against the 
various defendants and combinations of defendants.  The 
District Court issued an extremely thoughtful and very 
thorough 56-page Opinion, with its finding as to the issue 
before us essentially tucked away in little more than one 
paragraph near the end, see JA 55-56, undoubtedly because 
there had been no emphasis on the issue in the District Court 
and little record made as to it.   
 
 In the face of all of this, the Majority, in a sweeping 
Opinion, has decided this enormously important issue.  And it 
did not stop there.  Rather, it went on to conclude that “[e]ven 
if there were any doubt about whether immigration detainers 
are requests and not mandatory orders,” to read § 287.7 to 
mean that a federal detainer is a command to a law 
enforcement agency to detain an individual would violate the 
anti-commandeering principle of the Tenth Amendment.  
Maj. Op. at 17.     
 
 Maybe it would, and maybe it wouldn’t, even 
assuming, with no great confidence, that the Tenth 
Amendment issue should have been reached.  Galarza did, 
indeed, raise the issue in the District Court.  The County, 
however, never offered a full-throated response on the merits, 
or lack thereof, of that issue, arguing instead that the 
constitutionality of § 287.7 should be litigated in another, 
more appropriate, case.  Not unimportantly, the District Court 
did not in its lengthy Opinion even mention, much less 
decide, anything to do with the Tenth Amendment.  Very 
importantly, the United States was not heard as to it.   
 
 All of this makes me very uncomfortable.  Given the 
posture of the case before the District Court, I’m not sure 
how, if at all, the United States could have been brought in.  
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What I am sure of is that we have gone very far in this very 
important case without any input from the United States, and 
we should pull back now.  For now, though, I’m not prepared 
to say, on what has essentially been a one-sided presentation, 
that “shall” really doesn’t mean “shall” but, instead, means 
“please.”  I respectfully dissent.   
